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BEKELE v. LYFT, INC.

Do I believe in arbitration? I do. But not in arbitration between the lion
and the lamb, in which the lamb is in the morning found inside of the
lion. . . . There can be arbitration only between equals.1
Arbitration is a private, out-of-court system whereby an arbitrator decides the
rules, weighs the facts and arguments, and makes a binding decision.2 It has been an
alternative method of dispute resolution for centuries.3 The Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA) was enacted in 1925 to counter judicial refusal to enforce arbitration
agreements and to place such agreements on the same level as any other contract.4
Use of arbitration agreements in contracts has increased since the early 1990s,5 with
tens of millions of consumer contracts 6 and more than fifty-five percent of
employment contracts containing an arbitration provision today.7 Most contracts
contain arbitration provisions because arbitration is considered a faster, less costly
alternative to litigation.8
Nevertheless, the incorporation of arbitration provisions into contracts raises
concerns because consumers often do not realize what they agreed to in the contract.9
For instance, when potential customers download a new smartphone application
(“app”), a terms of service agreement may pop up and ask them to agree to the terms

1.

The Labor Question, Rocky Mountain News (Denver), Feb. 10, 1888, reprinted in 2 The Samuel
Gompers Papers: The Early Years of the American Federation of Labor, 1887-90, at 87
(Stuart B. Kaufman ed., 1987).

2.

The Emp. Rights Advocacy Inst. for Law & Policy, Taking “Forced” Out of Arbitration 2
(2016), http://employeerightsadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Taking-Forced-Out-OfArbitration_English_Final.pdf.

3.

See generally Carli N. Conklin, Introduction: Beyond the FAA: Arbitration Procedure, Practice, and Policy in
Historical Perspective, 2016 J. Disp. Resol. 1, 1–2 (2016) (providing a brief history of arbitration).

4.

Jacob Spencer, Note, Arbitration, Class Waivers, and Statutory Rights, 35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 991,
991, 995 (2012) (explaining the background of the FAA).

5.

Katherine V. W. Stone, Procedure, Substance, and Power: Collective Litigation and Arbitration Under the
Labor Law, 61 UCLA L. Rev. Discourse 164, 167 (2013) (explaining changes to a broad interpretation
of the FAA and the corresponding effects, including the enforcement of arbitration clauses in a wider
range of cases).

6.

Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Arbitration Study: Report to Congress Pursuant to DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1028(a), at 9 (2015), http://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf.

7.

Alexander J.S. Colvin, Econ. Policy Inst., The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration:
Access to the Courts Is Now Barred for More than 60 Million American Workers 1 (2017),
https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/135056.pdf.

8.

See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011) (holding that the FAA preempts
states from conditioning the enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the availability of class-wide
arbitration procedures).

9.

See Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts,
43 J. Legal Stud. 1, 2–3 (2014) (finding less than one percent of consumers access, read, and
understand standard software user agreements, many of which contain arbitration agreements).
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or cancel use.10 A vast majority of us touch “Agree” without reading the terms.11 A
recent experiment involving a fictitious social networking site found that seventy-four
percent of users agreed to the terms of service without reading them.12 During the
experiment, people spent an average of just fifty-one seconds reading the agreement,
and ninety-eight percent of the users missed the provision requiring they give up their
first-born child as payment.13
As technology advances, more apps are being developed to help consumers
maneuver daily life.14 With the touch of a few buttons, they have access to services
such as food delivery, banking, fitness, and transportation.15 They can even apply for
jobs through apps.16 Typically, these apps contain terms of service agreements that
consumers must accept before being able to continue.17 In the employment law arena,
the increased popularity of arbitration agreements combined with the widespread
acceptance of terms of use agreements can diminish employees’ rights.18

10.

Id. This is known as a click-wrap agreement. Id. at 12.

11.

See Thomas J. Maronick, Do Consumers Read Terms of Service Agreements When Installing Software? A
Two-Study Empirical Analysis, Int’l J. Bus. & Soc. Res., June 2014, at 137, 144 (finding seventy-five
percent of participants in a study did not read a terms of service agreement or spent less than one minute
reading the provisions).

12.

Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring the Privacy
Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services 20 (Sept. 23, 2017) (unpublished
working paper) (on file with SSRN), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2757465.

13.

Id. at 12, 17.

14.

See Sarah Perez, App Store to Reach 5 Million Apps by 2020, with Games Leading the Way, TechCrunch
(Aug. 10, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/08/10/app-store-to-reach-5-million-apps-by-2020-withgames-leading-the-way/.

15.

See Eric Walters, The 50 Essential Android Apps (2016), Paste Mag. (May 31, 2016, 3:15 PM), https://
www.pastemagazine.com/articles/2016/05/the-50-essential-android-apps-2016.html. The average
consumer uses over thirty apps per month on her smartphone. App Annie, Spotlight on Consumer
App Usage 6 (2017), http://files.appannie.com.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/1705_Report_Consumer_
App_Usage_EN.pdf.

16.

See, e.g., Robin Madell, Job Seekers’ Secret Weapon: Mobile Devices, Not the Web, U.S. News (Feb. 18,
2014, 9:10 AM), https://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/outside-voices-careers/2014/02/18/jobseekers-secret-weapon-mobile-devices-not-the-web (pointing to the emerging role of mobile apps in the
hiring process); Kit Eaton, Looking for a New Job? These Free Apps Can Help, N. Y. Times, Sept. 1, 2016,
at B9, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/technology/personaltech/looking-for-a-new-job-thesefree-apps-can-help.html (describing various apps that can be used to search and apply for jobs).

17.

See Misty E. Vermaat, Discovering Computers & Microsoft Office 2013, at 156 (Kathleen
McMahon ed. 2015) (stating that a terms of service agreement is “the right to use [an] . . . app” and that
consumers must accept the terms in a license agreement before using the software”); Bakos, supra note
9, at 12–13.

18.

See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory
Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 Brook. L. Rev. 1309 (2015) (explaining that laws
protecting employees rely on employees to bring lawsuits to protect their own rights, which has left
many workers without access to justice).
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For instance, in a recent employment classification case, Bekele v. Lyft, Inc.,19 the
plaintiff agreed to the Terms of Service Agreement for the app that he downloaded
when applying to become a Lyft driver.20 Within the agreement was an arbitration
provision 21 that waived the right to participate in class actions or to be part of a
collective action.22 The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts held
that the plaintiff was bound by the arbitration agreement.23 This Case Comment
contends that the District Court erred in compelling arbitration because the court
did not consider whether there was a contrary congressional command in the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) overriding the FAA. The court also ignored
Supreme Court precedent in its interpretation of the NLRA and failed to realize the
importance of an employee’s right to collective or class action. The Bekele decision
allows employers to restrict fundamental employee rights through an app’s terms of
service agreement.
In May 2014, Yilkal Bekele applied to become a driver for Lyft, Inc. (a ridehailing service app) in Massachusetts.24 To apply, Bekele had to download the Lyft
app, register, and either accept Lyft’s Terms of Service Agreement or cancel his
registration process.25 As part of the terms of the agreement that Bekele accepted, he
agreed to waive his “right to a trial by jury or to participate as a plaintiff or class
member in any purported class action or representative proceeding.”26 Bekele accepted
this agreement, applied to become a driver, and began driving in August 2014. 27 On
March 17, 2015, Bekele filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Superior Court on
behalf of himself and all other Lyft drivers in the commonwealth.28 Bekele claimed
that Lyft had misclassified the drivers as independent contractors29 and as a result,
19.

199 F. Supp. 3d 284 (D. Mass. 2016).

20. Id. at 289, 291.
21.

For the purposes of this Case Comment, the term “arbitration agreement” refers to an arbitration
provision within an overarching agreement or contract that was agreed to by the parties in the case.

22.

Bekele, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 289.

23.

Id. at 313.

24.

See id. at 289.

25.

Id. Usually terms of service agreements can be accepted by a user in two ways: affirmatively clicking to
acknowledge agreement to the terms (commonly referred to as a “click-wrap” agreement) or continuing
to use the site with an option to click on a link to the terms and service agreement of the website
(“browse-wrap” agreement). Allison S. Brehm & Cathy D. Lee, “Click Here to Accept the Terms of Service”,
Comm. Law., Winter 2015, at 4, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/
communications_lawyer/january2015/CL_Win15_v31n1.authcheckdam.pdf. In this case, the user
agreement was a click-wrap agreement where the Terms of Service Agreement popped up and the user
had to touch “I Accept” before the user was able to proceed into the app. Bekele, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 289.

26. Bekele, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 290.
27.

Id. at 288–89.

28. Id. at 291.
29. The Department of Labor, for the purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), considers an

“independent contractor” to be a worker with economic independence who is operating a business of her
own. Wage & Hour Div., U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Administrator Interpretations Letter–Fair
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violated the Massachusetts Wage Act, which defines “employee.”30 He also claimed
that Lyft’s incorrect classification of drivers as independent contractors, rather than
employees, caused the drivers to make expenditures, such as the costs of car
ownership, maintenance, and gas, that should have been paid for by an employer.31
On April 21, 2015, Lyft removed the action to federal court due to diversity of
citizenship, and the suit was heard in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts.32 Bekele claimed that: (1) the binding arbitration was invalid, because
he did not have reasonable notice of the arbitration agreement; and (2) even if the
arbitration agreement was valid, the agreement was unenforceable because it was
unconscionable and illegal, 33 as it violated sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA. 34 Lyft
moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Bekele had received reasonable notice of
the provision and had assented to the terms and conditions.35 Lyft also alleged that
the claims under the Massachusetts Wage Act fell within the scope of the arbitration
agreement’s language.36
Regarding Bekele’s first claim, the court found that the agreement was valid and
that he received reasonable notice.37 The Bekele court applied Massachusetts law to
determine whether the agreement was valid, which requires the court to assess
whether the defendant gave a sufficient level of notice and that the plaintiff
Labor Standards Act No. 2015-1 (2015). Under the FLSA, an “employee” is an “individual employed
by an employer.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012).
30. Bekele, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 291. See also § 148B of the Massachusetts Wage Act, stating that

an individual performing any service, except as authorized under this chapter, shall be
considered an employee under those chapters unless: (1) the individual is free from
control and direction in connection with the performance of the service, both under his
contract for the performance of service and in fact; and (2) the service is performed
outside the usual course of the business of the employer; and (3) the individual is
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or
business of the same nature as that involved in the service performed.

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 148B (2016).
31.

Bekele, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 289.

32.

Id. at 288, 291. During the motion hearing, both parties agreed to convert Lyft’s motion to dismiss into
a motion for partial summary judgment on the arbitrability of the issue. Id. at 292.

33.

Unconscionability and illegality are two doctrines of contract law that may render a contract voidable or
unenforceable. 1 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 1:21 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database
updated May 2017). A court may find unconscionability when the contract is one-sided, unfair, or
oppressive. 8 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 18.1 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database
updated May 2017). A court may find illegality when the contract violates existing law or public policy.
17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 297, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2017).

34. Bekele, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 293 –94, 304 . The FAA provides for the enforcement of valid written

arbitration agreements “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).

35.

Bekele, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 293.

36. Id.
37.

Id. at 298.
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manifested assent to its terms.38 Notice may be sufficient when “under the totality of
the circumstances, the employer’s communication would have provided a reasonably
prudent employee notice of the waiver [of the right to proceed in a judicial forum].”39
The court reasoned that Massachusetts courts have routinely concluded that clickwrap agreements provide users with reasonable communication of an agreement’s
terms, and the courts need not assess whether “plaintiffs had actual notice of the
terms of the agreement, [but whether] plaintiffs had reasonable notice.”40 The Bekele
court concluded that reasonable notice was provided because Lyft’s arbitration
agreement was “displayed on the user’s screen with prominent bold headings” and,
unlike an arbitration agreement in another case,41 had the entire Terms of Service
Agreement on the screen.42 Finding that there was reasonable notice, the Bekele court
then assessed whether Bekele had expressly manifested assent to the terms and
conditions of the agreement.43 The Bekele court concluded that there was little
question that Bekele had manifested assent to the Terms of Service Agreement
because he had pressed the “I Accept” button at the bottom of the agreement.44
The court next examined whether the arbitration agreement was unenforceable
under the FAA because it was substantively or procedurally unconscionable, and
found that it was neither.45 The court also examined whether the arbitration
agreement’s class action waiver was illegal because it violated a substantive protected
right under the NLRA; the court held that the right to bring a class action suit was
38. Id. at 295.
39.

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ellerbee v. Gamestop, Inc. 604 F. Supp. 2d 349, 354 (D. Mass.
2009)).

40. Id. at 295–96 (quoting Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 14-14750-DPW, 2016 WL 3751652, at *20

(D. Mass., July 11, 2016).

41.

The Bekele court cited Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., in which the court assessed whether Uber’s Terms
of Service agreement provided sufficient notice of its arbitration agreement. 2016 WL 3751652, at *6.
The Uber agreement stated that “[b]y creating an Uber account, you agree to the Terms of Service &
Privacy Policy” and included a link to view the policy in its entirety. Id. at *3, *7. The arbitration
agreement was on the last few pages of the policy. Id. The Cullinane court found that the registration
phrase put a reasonable user on notice of the terms of the agreement and that a reasonable user who
cared to pursue the issue would have inquiry notice of the terms of the arbitration agreement. Id. at *7.
Therefore, the Cullinane court concluded that Uber provided sufficient notice. Id.; Bekele, 199 F. Supp.
3d at 296.

42.

Bekele, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 296–97.

43.

Id. at 297.

44. Courts have viewed such affirmative conduct as meeting the requirement of manifestation of assent. Id.

at 297–98 (citing Cullinane, 2016 WL 3751652, at *6).

45.

Id. at 300, 303. The court applied Massachusetts common law to determine whether the contract was
unconscionable. Id. at 300. Under Massachusetts common law, “a plaintiff must show that . . . the terms
are oppressive to one party” (substantive unconscionability) and “the circumstances surrounding the
formation of the contract show that the aggrieved party [has] no meaningful choice and was subject to
unfair surprise” (procedural unconscionability). Id. at 299. The court found that Bekele did not meet the
burden demonstrating that the contract was unconscionable. Id. at 303. Further details concerning these
unconscionability judgments will not be addressed, as this Case Comment does not challenge the
unconscionability of the agreement.
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not a substantive right, but rather a procedural vehicle by which an employee may
seek to enforce substantive rights.46 After an analysis of the current circuit split over
the issue,47 the court reasoned that an “employee’s ability to bring a class action,
either in court or arbitration,”48 was not a substantive right because class actions were
not protected under section 7 of the NLRA.49
The court applied the principle of statutory construction known as ejusdem
generis, by which a court interprets a general phrase or “catchall” at the end of a list
of specific people or things to cover only people or things of a similar class or
character as those already enumerated.50 The Bekele court found that within section 7
of the NLRA, that general phrase was “other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”51 The court examined the
specific rights enumerated: “the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations,” and the right “to bargain collectively through representatives of
[the employees’] own choosing.”52 The court then concluded that the specific
enumerated rights included only collective employee actions such as picketing and
organizing boycotts—not bringing class actions.53
Because the court concluded that the right to bring a class action was not covered
within the general phrase in section 7 of the NLRA, class actions were classified as
a procedural, not substantive, right, making the arbitration agreement irrevocable.54
Finding that the contract was enforceable, the court granted Lyft’s motion to compel
arbitration and dismissed Bekele’s complaint.55
46. Id. at 309–13. A substantive right is “a right that can be protected or enforced by law,” whereas a

procedural right is “a right that derives from legal or administrative procedure,” a right that helps to
protect or enforce a substantive right. Right, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

47.

Until 2016, most federal courts held that class action waivers in arbitration agreements did not violate
the NLRA. Bekele, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 304; see Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLC, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir.
2016); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016). In Lewis, the Seventh Circuit held that
class actions are covered under section 7 of the NLRA, and thus the class action waiver in the disputed
arbitration agreement was illegal and unenforceable. 823 F.3d at 1160–61. In Morris, the Ninth Circuit
also held that class action waivers violate the NLRA and are unenforceable. 834 F.3d at 987–90.

48. Bekele, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 310.
49. Id. at 311–12. Section 7 provides that: “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,

join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).

50. Bekele, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 310. “Under the ejusdem generis rule of construction the general words are

confined to the class and may not be used to enlarge it.” Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 18
(1946). “[E]jusdem generis cannot be employed to ‘obscure and defeat the intent and purpose of Congress’
or ‘render general words meaningless.’” Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 163
(2012) (quoting United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680, 682 (1950)).

51.

Bekele, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 310.

52.

Id.

53.

Id.

54. Id. at 311–13.
55.

Id. at 313–14.
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This Case Comment contends that the court erred in compelling arbitration.
First, the court unduly ignored whether the NLRA presented a contrary congressional
command overriding arbitration agreement enforcement. Second, had the court
followed Supreme Court precedent in its interpretation of section 7 of the NLRA, it
would have found that the catchall includes the right to bring class actions. Lastly,
the court’s decision to uphold the class action waiver in the arbitration provision set
a dangerous precedent for the vindication of employees’ rights.
The Bekele court failed to consider an exception to the enforcement of arbitration
agreements: a contrary congressional command.56 Three Supreme Court decisions,
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 57 CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 58 and
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,59 articulated the legal tests for
exceptions to arbitration agreement enforcement: (1) when a ground exists at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract;60 (2) when there is an overriding
congressional command;61 and (3) when an arbitration provision eliminates a party’s
substantive right to pursue a statutory remedy.62 The Bekele court thought that the
only exception relevant to the case was the first exception.63
56. A contrary congressional command is a demonstration of congressional intent that precludes

enforcement of the statute in question. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 –27
(1987).

57.

563 U.S. 333 (2011) (examining whether a California law prohibiting arbitration fell within the
exception when a ground exists at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract).

58. 565 U.S. 95 (2012) (examining whether the CRO Act presented an overriding congressional command

barring enforceability of an arbitration agreement).

59.

133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (examining whether a class action waiver in an arbitration agreement effectively
eliminated the party’s right to pursue statutory remedies under antitrust laws).

60. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343 (holding that a state law ground to revoke the agreement was not applicable

because it was contrary to the congressionally created objective of the FAA). This is the primary
exception to the FAA, known as the “savings clause.” See David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act
Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public Policy, 101 Geo. L.J. 1217, 1219 (2013) (describing the savings
clause as the “centerpiece” of FAA preemption). The FAA provides that arbitration agreements are
equal to other contracts and requires the enforcement of arbitration agreements “save upon grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).

61.

CompuCredit, 565 U.S. at 98 (holding that a violation of a federal statute does not invalidate an
agreement to arbitrate unless it has been overridden by a contrary congressional command).

62. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309–10 (stating that in addition to the two other established

exceptions, an arbitration agreement is invalid if it prevents the effective vindication of a right).

63. Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 284, 309 (D. Mass. 2016). The Bekele court first mentioned that a

validly formed arbitration agreement must be enforced unless one of two exceptions applies: If there is
any ground that would make a contract unenforceable or if the FAA is precluded by another federal
statute’s contrary command. Id. at 292–93. The court later stated that the Supreme Court has recognized
three exceptions to the enforceability of arbitration agreements under the FAA. Id. at 309. The Bekele
court cited two Supreme Court cases in the first explanation of the exceptions to the enforceability of
the FAA that addressed individual exception claims, id. at 292–93 (citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339
and CompuCredit, 565 U.S. at 98), whereas the case citation in the second explanation mentioned the
three recognized exceptions. Id. at 309 (citing Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309–10). Therefore, the
second explanation is correct in asserting that there are three recognized exceptions.
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However, the Bekele court should have examined whether there was a contrary
congressional command because the NLRA is a federal law regulating employee
rights that were at issue in the case.64 The Supreme Court has previously examined a
contrary federal law when considering the enforceability of an arbitration agreement.65
For example, in CompuCredit, the Supreme Court examined whether the Credit
Repair Organizations Act (the “CRO Act”) was a contrary congressional command
that rendered an arbitration agreement unenforceable because the CRO Act regulated
credit organizations and established consumer rights.66
In CompuCredit, the plaintiffs signed a credit card agreement with an arbitration
provision in the belief that the card had a certain credit limit and could be used to
rebuild poor credit.67 The plaintiffs filed suit for alleged violations of the CRO Act.68
When CompuCredit moved to compel arbitration, the plaintiffs opposed the motion
because the CRO Act contained a non-waiver provision stating that “[a]ny waiver by
any consumer of any protection provided . . . shall be treated as void.”69 The Supreme
Court concluded that the CRO Act created the right to receive a disclosure statement
from the credit repair organization, but not the right to bring an action in a court of
law.70 The Court reasoned that the non-waiver provision was not a contrary
congressional command overriding the FAA because when Congress enacted the
CRO Act in 1996, arbitration clauses in consumer contracts were quite common, and
if Congress meant to prohibit arbitration, it would have done so with clarity.71
CompuCredit clearly articulated that a contrary congressional command is one of the
exceptions to the enforcement of arbitration agreements.72
Similarly, in American Express Co., the Court articulated the rule for the
enforceability of credit card arbitration agreements. 73 The Court considered whether
an overriding congressional command existed in the antitrust laws.74 It held that the
class action waiver was enforceable because there was no contrary congressional
command overriding the FAA.75 The Court reasoned that the antitrust laws did not
64. This Case Comment asserts that the NLRA is a contrary congressional command. The plaintiff in the

Bekele case asserted that the class action waiver violated the NLRA and the arbitration agreement was
unenforceable because it was illegal.

65.

CompuCredit, 565 U.S. at 99–104; Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238–42
(1987).

66. 565 U.S. at 98.
67.

Id. at 97.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 97–99.
70. Id. at 99.
71.

Id. at 103.

72. See id. at 101, 103.
73. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
74.

Id. at 2309.

75. Id.
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evince an intention to preclude a class action waiver because the antitrust laws made
no mention of class action.76 Unlike the Bekele court, the Court then continued its
analysis by considering another exception to arbitration agreement enforcement.77 As
demonstrated in Italian Colors, the Bekele court was not limited to consideration of
one exception to the enforcement of arbitration agreements and should have
considered whether the NLRA was a contrary congressional command.78
CompuCredit and Italian Colors articulated the legal test to determine when a
contrary congressional command exists.79 Unlike the Supreme Court in CompuCredit
and Italian Colors, however, the Bekele court did not consider whether a contrary
congressional command existed because it relied on a Fifth Circuit decision80 that
found there was no explicit contrary congressional command in the NLRA based on
the precedent of CompuCredit.81 Nor did the Bekele court consider the contrary
congressional command exception, because it concluded that Supreme Court
precedent favored arbitration even when there were class action waivers in the
agreements,82 and did not find the case at hand distinguishable from Italian Colors or
CompuCredit.83
This Case Comment contends that the NLRA is a contrary congressional
command from which it can be inferred that Congress intended to protect “collective
activities,” such as class actions. A contrary congressional command is “ ‘deducible
from [the statute’s] text or legislative history,’ or . . . an inherent conflict between
arbitration and the statute’s underlying purpose.” 84 While the NLRA does not
explicitly prohibit individual arbitration, the NLRA’s text, history, and underlying
76. Id.
77.

After the contrary congressional command analysis, the Court analyzed whether respondents satisfied a
judge-made exception of the FAA, which invalidates agreements that “prevent the ‘effective vindication’
of a federal statutory right.” Id. at 2310.

78. See id. at 2309–10.
79. See Shelley McGill & Ann Marie Tracey, The Next Chapter: Revisiting the Policy in Favor of Arbitration

in the Context of Effective Vindication of Statutory Claims, 31 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 547, 549, 559–60
(2014).

80. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The NLRA should

not be understood to contain a congressional command overriding application of the FAA.”).

81.

Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 284, 305 (D. Mass. Aug. 9, 2016) (quoting D.R. Horton, 737 F.3d
at 361). In D.R. Horton, the Fifth Circuit overturned an NLRB decision finding that class action
waivers in employment agreements violated the NLRA. 737 F.3d at 362. The Fifth Circuit hinted that
an implicit congressional command could potentially be found in the NLRA, but the court ultimately
examined the NLRA for an explicit command based on CompuCredit. Id. at 360 (citing CompuCredit
Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 100–01 (2012)).

82. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2315; CompuCredit, 565 U.S. at 98; AT&T Mobility LLC v.

Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345–46 (2011); Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 224
(1987).

83. Bekele, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 312.
84. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp.

v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985)).
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purpose communicate an overriding federal policy favoring employees’ right to act
collectively to improve the terms and conditions of their employment.85 Congress
first enacted the NLRA during the Great Depression86 to address the inequality in
bargaining power between employees and employers that led to unprecedented
strikes and “industrial unrest.”87 Congress wanted to codify the right for employees
to bargain collectively and to self-organize to improve employment terms and
conditions.88 As such, section 7 of the NLRA protects the right of employees to
“form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”89 To ensure
the NLRA’s enforcement, Congress added section 8(a)(1) to prevent employers from
interfering with employees’ rights guaranteed under section 790 and section 10 to
empower the NLRB to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor
practice.91 Collective litigation or arbitration is when a group of employees join
together to bring employment-related claims to dispute workplace terms or conditions,
the very type of activity protected under section 7.92 Participation in collective, or
class action, litigation or arbitration therefore qualifies as a concerted activity for the
purpose of mutual aid or protection under section 7 of the NLRA, thereby creating
a contrary congressional command.93
85. See James A. Gross, Conflicting Statutory Purposes: Another Look at Fifty Years of NLRB Law Making, 39

Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 710 (1985) (describing the underlying purpose of the NLRA); Nicole
Wredberg, Note, Subverting Workers’ Rights: Class Action Waivers and the Arbitral Threat to the NLRA, 67
Hastings L.J. 881, 882–86 (2016) (discussing the text, history, and underlying purpose of the NLRA).

86. Wredberg, supra note 85, at 882.
87.

29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (finding the denial of the right of employees to organize and accept the
procedure of collective bargaining led “to strikes and other forms of industrial strife”); Gross, supra note
85, at 10; Wredberg, supra note 85 at 882.

88. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
90. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012). Section 8(a)(1) states that it is an unfair labor practice for any employer “to

interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.” Id.

91.

29 U.S.C. § 160 (2012) (“The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from
engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce.”).

92.

See Stone, supra note 5, at 176–77 (citing D.R. Horton Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2279 (2012)); see also
Stephen C. Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action Part II: Interest, Class, and Representation, 27
UCLA L. Rev. 1067, 1071 (1980) (quoting Zechariah Chafee’s “the multitude” theory).

93.

See Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding pursuit of a concerted
work-related legal claim clearly falls within the wording of section 7); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823
F.3d 1147, 1152 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding courts and the NLRB have held that collective or class action
suits constitute “concerted activity”); Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 673 (8th Cir. 2011)
(finding a lawsuit filed in good faith by a group of employees is “concerted activity”); Altex Ready
Mixed Concrete Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 542 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding that
generally, filing by employees of a labor-related civil action is protected activity under section 7); D.R.
Horton, 357 N.L.R.B. at 2278 (holding concerted legal action addressing wages, hours, or working
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The legislative history of the NLRA also potentially indicates a congressional
position against arbitration.94 Most persuasively, the Senate Committee on Education
and Labor Report concerning the NLRA discussed the American attitude toward
arbitration at the time the NLRA’s enactment.95 Senator David Walsh (D-Mass.)
clarified that the act did not establish “any form of compulsory arbitration” and that
“compulsory arbitration has not received the sanction of the American people.” 96
Nevertheless, the opinions differ on the standard for a contrary congressional
command because courts now follow the clear congressional command standard set
forth in CompuCredit.97 A careful reading of CompuCredit indicates that the clear
congressional command standard for arbitration agreement enforcement applies only
to legislation enacted after the widespread use of arbitration agreements.98 The
Supreme Court reasoned that at the time of the CRO Act’s enactment, “arbitration
clauses in [consumer] contracts . . . were no rarity” and if Congress had wanted to
prohibit arbitration, then it would have “done so with . . . clarity.”99 In addition, as
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated in her dissent, the two statutes the Court cited as
exemplary preclusion of arbitration agreements were drafted and enacted after a
number of Supreme Court cases that compelled arbitration.100 Following this
reasoning, Congress would not have been on notice to write an explicit command
precluding arbitration before the rise in arbitration agreements in the 1990s.101 The
clear congressional command standard should only be applied to statutes enacted
when Congress was aware that arbitration agreements were common practice. The
NLRA was enacted in 1935 and last amended in 1959, much earlier than the spread
of arbitration agreements in the 1990s.102 Therefore, the Bekele court’s reliance on the
Fifth Circuit’s analysis was misplaced, and it erred in failing to consider that the
conditions is protected under section 7). To be clear, this Case Comment contends that the NLRA is a
contrary congressional command, not a basis for the illegality of the class action waiver.
94. S. Rep. No. 74-573, at 8 (1935), reprinted in Statutes and Congressional Reports Pertaining to

the National Labor Relations Board 76 (1945).

95. Id.
96. Id. at 2–3, 8.
97.

Courts have interpreted CompuCredit as requiring a finding of an explicit congressional intention
against arbitration to find a contrary congressional command. Walthour v. Chiplo Windshield Repair
LLC, 745 F.3d 1326, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2014); D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 360–61 (5th
Cir. 2013); Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 2d 831, 845 (N.D. Cal. 2012).

98. Recent Case, Arbitration and Class Actions—National Labor Relations Act—District Court Enforces Class

Action Waiver in Employment Arbitration Agreement.—Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., No.
11-CV-05405 YGR, 2012 WL 1604851 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2012), 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1122, 1127 (2013)
(“CompuCredit adds a threshold inquiry before reaching this test: If Congress had intended to bar
application of the FAA in the given context, would it have done so in explicit terms?”).

99. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 103 (2012).
100. Id. at 116 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
101. Recent Case, supra note 98, at 1126.
102. William N. Cooke, W.E. Upjohn Inst. for Emp’t Research, Union Organizing and Public

Policy 1, 19 (1985).
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clear congressional command standard was limited to legislation enacted after the
rise of arbitration agreements in the 1990s.103
The Bekele court further erred in its narrow interpretation of the catchall in
section 7 because it did not follow Supreme Court and First Circuit precedent.104
The Supreme Court has interpreted the catchall in section 7 to have two parts for
interpretation: “other concerted activity” and “mutual aid or protection.”105 For
instance, in Eastex, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, the Court broadly
interpreted “mutual aid or protection” to protect employees when “they seek to
improve terms and conditions of employment or otherwise improve their lot . . .
through channels outside the immediate employee-employer relationship.”106 The
Court also reasoned that the “mutual aid or protection” shields employees from
retaliation when they seek to improve work terms or working conditions through
administrative and judicial forums.107
In National Labor Relations Board v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., the Supreme Court
found that the NLRB’s broad interpretation of “concerted activity” was reasonable
because there was no indication that Congress wanted to limit “concerted activity” to
“situations in which an employee’s activity and that of his fellow employees combine
with one another in any particular way.”108 The Court further reasoned that it did not
seem as though Congress intended to have the protection withdrawn when a single
employee acted alone to participate in the collective process.109 Finally, the First
Circuit110 has recognized that “the filing of a labor related civil action by a group of
employees is ordinarily a concerted activity protected by [section] 7, unless the
employees acted in bad faith.”111 The District Court of Massachusetts followed the
First Circuit’s interpretation in its memorandum decision, Tigges v. AM Pizza, Inc.,
concluding that “the very essence of labor right[s] under the . . . National Labor
Relations Act is collective action” and therefore a substantive federal right.112
103. See Recent Case, supra note 98, at 1127.
104. The second argument of this Case Comment switches to a critique of the analysis conducted by the

Bekele court within the construction of unenforceability on the grounds that the contract was illegal,
rather than the congressional command exception.

105. Eastex, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 437 U.S. 556, 564 (1978); Wredberg, supra note 85, at 894–95.
106. 437 U.S. at 565.
107. Id. at 565–66.
108. 465 U.S. 822, 831, 835 (1984).
109. Id. at 835.
110. The First Circuit is the court that hears appeals from federal district courts in Maine, Massachusetts,

New Hampshire, Puerto Rico and Rhode Island, which means that the Bekele court is bound by the
decisions of the First Circuit. About the Court, U.S. Ct. Appeals for First Cir., http://www.ca1.
uscourts.gov/about-court (last visited Apr. 1, 2018).

111. Leviton Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 486 F.2d 686, 689 (1st Cir. 1973).
112. See No. 16-10136-WGY, 2016 WL 4076829, at *13–14 (D. Mass. July 29, 2016) (alteration in original)

(quoting Status Conference Transcript at 4, Reeves v. PMLRA Pizza, Inc., No. 16-10474-WGY (D.
Mass. May 23, 2016)).
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Given the established interpretations of section 7, the Bekele court should have
looked to precedent rather than the ejusdem generis canon of construction.113 Had the
Bekele court followed City Disposal Systems and Eastex, the entire section 7 catchall
would have been interpreted as combined employee activity that seeks to improve
terms and conditions of employment through administrative and judicial forums.114
As a result, it would have found that the class action waiver violates the NLRA,
which renders the waiver illegal and unenforceable, and therefore, should have
dismissed the motion to compel arbitration.
The Bekele court’s decision to uphold the class action waiver in the arbitration
provision set a dangerous precedent for the vindication of employees’ rights and
undermines the purpose of the NLRA. As mentioned before, Congress enacted the
NLRA because employees were usually in an unequal position when they tried to
negotiate with or challenge an employer.115 Section 7 of the NLRA gives employees
the right to join together in their efforts to improve terms or conditions of their
employment.116 Class and collective actions are mechanisms for individuals to pool
their resources to be able to afford to litigate or arbitrate a claim, or to aggregate
similar small claims into a larger one.117 As part of a group, an individual may
perceive that the risk of retaliation is minimized or that a claim may be more
successful with more claimants than just herself.118 In addition, class or collective
actions against an employer may lead to more effective relief than an individual
claim. For example, a court can issue injunctive relief such as mandatory training of
supervisory personnel and employees.119 However, the Bekele court upheld the class
113. See generally Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?,

96 Geo. L.J. 1863 (2008) (arguing stare decisis effect would result in consistent and reliable statutory
interpretation). Stare decisis is the doctrine of precedent, which requires courts to follow earlier judicial
decisions when the similar issues arise. Stare Decisis, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

114. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 982 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding pursuit of a concerted work-

related legal claim clearly falls within the wording of section 7); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d
1147, 1152 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding courts and the NLRB have held that collective or class action suits
constitute “concerted activity”); Brady v. Nat’l Football League, 644 F.3d 661, 673 (8th Cir. 2011)
(finding a lawsuit filed in good faith by a group of employees is “concerted activity”); Altex Ready
Mixed Concrete Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 542 F.2d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding filing
by employees of a labor-related civil action is protected activity under section 7); Leviton Mfg. Co, 486
F.2d at 689 (finding a lawsuit filed in good faith by a group of employees is “concerted activity”); D.R.
Horton Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2277, 2279 (2012) (holding concerted legal action addressing wages, hours,
or working conditions is protected under section 7).

115. See sources cited supra note 87.
116. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
117. Michael D. Schwartz, A Substantive Right to Class Proceedings: The False Conflict Between the FAA and

NLRA, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2945, 2950–51 (2013) (discussing the purpose of class action); Yeazell,
supra note 93, at 1071.

118. Sternlight, supra note 18, at 1350 (citing Ruffin v. Great Dane Trailers, 969 F.2d 989, 991, 993 (11th

Cir. 1992) (upholding an injunction issued by the trial court requiring an employer to “take active steps
to reduce and eliminate the racial joking and slurs and episodes”)).

119. Id.
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action waiver in the employment context, thereby removing employees’ access to
these tools and undermining the NLRA’s protections that sought to put employees
on an equal footing with their employers.
The approval of class action waivers in arbitration provisions of employment
contracts solidifies employees’ inequality.120 The Bekele court’s decision to uphold the
class action waiver in the arbitration provision set a dangerous precedent for the
vindication of employees’ rights and undermines the purpose of the NLRA. The
court unduly ignored the possible existence of a contrary congressional command in
the NLRA overriding the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration agreements. The
court also failed to follow Supreme Court and First Circuit precedent in its
interpretation of the NLRA. Finally, it failed to protect the employee rights
established in the NLRA. If courts continue to enforce arbitration provisions limiting
employees to bringing their claims individually, then employees will be forced to
stand on unequal footing when vindicating their rights to be free from discrimination,
earn a fair wage, enjoy fair working conditions, and more.121

120. Craig Becker, Labor Law—The Law of a Balanced Society: A Reply to Professor Epstein, 41 Cap. U. L. Rev.

35, 44–45 (2013); Stone, supra note 5, at 166; Wredberg supra note 85, at 886–89.

121. Sternlight, supra note 18, at 1309 (arguing that arbitration agreements prevent workers from bringing

individual or class claims and obtaining access to justice); see also James R. Montgomery, Note, “Horton
and the Who”: Determining Who Is Affected by the Emerging Statutory Battle Between the FAA and Federal
Labor Law, 2014 J. Disp. Resol. 363, 374–78 (2014) (arguing the Fifth Circuit decision in D.R. Horton
could mean that wronged employees will never have their claims vindicated).
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